Is it time to utter the "R" word?

(Realignment that is) Nate Cohn has an interesting take that rings true, and what should we read from it? As always, I have thoughts...

On Christmas morning, as I was sipping my second cup of coffee, I stumbled across this article by Nate Cohn of the NY Times: “Trump’s Re-election Defines a New Era of American Politics” (gift link) wherein he posits that while the Trump win in 2016, came too close for comfort in 2020, and finally winning the popular and EC vote in 2024, he has engendered a significant shift in the political landscape.

Nate gets awfully close to the term “realignment”. If you harken back in US political history, there have been a few noteworthy realignments. First the ending of the gilded age brought the Democrats to power in the early 1930’s, where FDR crafted the New Deal, greatly expanding the footprint and reach of government. This really chafed the Republican’s thighs and ignited the inner rage of the conservatives.

But there was always a faction of Republicans that were progressive and — dare I say it — liberal? Tracing the thread from Teddy Roosevelt, through Ike, and up to the Rockefeller Republicans of the late 60’s and 70’s.

The Great Society of LBJ was the harbinger of the second realignment, that was the rise of Atwater’s “Southern Strategy” and the fuckery of the Goldwater libertarian branch.

But the culmination of that in Reagan’s three-legged stool of Republican policies (Small government, the religious right, and hawkish foreign policy) really set the Jell-O for 30+ years.

Going back to 2012, and the re-election of Obama, it seemed at the time like there was a cementing of a new liberal order:

When Barack Obama won re-election in 2012, it seemed to mark the beginning of a new era of Democratic dominance, one propelled by the rise of a new generation of young, secular and nonwhite voters.

With hindsight, the 2012 election looks more like the end of an era: the final triumph of the social movements of the 1960s over the once-dominant Reagan Republicans.

I remember that election well, and at the time, all the “demography will win” was all the rage (Ruy Texiera seems to have lost his zeal for that argument he was fond of making).

Thus, it did seem like the stodgy old three-legged stool was finally crumbling.

And it was, but not in the way that many thought. No, it had served its purpose, paving the way for the Trump era.

And, what an era it has become. Nate continues:

Until Mr. Trump, there was a lot about American politics that you could take for granted. The meaning of the two parties seemed clear. Republicans represented Reagan’s three-legged stool of small-government fiscal conservatism, the religious right and foreign policy hawks. Democrats represented the working class, change and the causes of liberal activists.

Every four years, the two parties mostly litigated the same fights over the same issues. They rehashed arguments over war and diplomacy; entitlement spending and tax cuts; “family values” and the social movements of the 1960s; or trade and free enterprise versus labor and protecting jobs. It led to predictable demographic divides and recurring, long-term electoral trends.

Ah, what a grand time to be alive. But that grand time was hiding an undercurrent of change and change that would be fed by Trump.

In hindsight, the rise of the Tea Party, and the astroturfing by proto-oligarchs that fed the movement should have been a klaxon call of danger.

The biggest casualty were areas that the two sides shared some common threads.

Longstanding areas of bipartisan consensus have suddenly become fiercely contested. Immigration, free trade, America’s postwar alliances and even America’s support for democracy at home and abroad have all become defining conflicts between the two parties during the Trump era, rather than areas of agreement. Yet at the same time, the two parties seem to have reached a truce on the most bitter fights of the Bush-Obama era, like the war in Iraq, Social Security and same-sex marriage.

That truce is looking rather skimpy these days.

But what I take away from this essay (and I do recommend that you read it in its entirety) is that the old-line Republicans, the stalwarts who adhered to their precious Reaganism, are without a home. These “Never Trump” former Republicans have built some media success, and their arguments (and support against Trump) are welcome. But as we have seen in the 2024 election is that this old-guard of the Conservative Republicans is really a minuscule cohort, not enough to do much more than clutch their fist while yelling at the ether.

Alas, they are even further removed from actual power than the Democrats, with their dream of rebuilding a utopian vision of a future Conservative Republican party once Trump exits.

Alas, I am 99.9% sure that after Trump shuffles off this mortal coil, there will be no tacking back to sanity and rationality by the Republicans. The MAGA movement is now mainstream, and there appears to be little general will in the population to let this fever dream finally subside.

No, that three-legged stool, and the dance with the Democrats on issues that would waft and wane throughout the decades is done. Frankly, I also don’t see the Democrats being successful in the future unless they quit playing footsies with the far left¹.

This should make you take pause (it sure does for me):

The exit polls found Mr. Trump losing voters making over $100,000 a year, while winning among voters making less — including those making less than $50,000. If anything, 20th-century fights are emerging as plausible areas of bipartisan consensus, with Republicans seemingly receptive to labor and spending on infrastructure, while Democrats seem more open to deregulation and supply-side remedies to problems like housing and energy.

This flipping is stunning. The Republicans have ALWAYS been most associated with the upper tiers of income voters. And while at the top 1% they still rule, it is the moderately comfortable upper-middle class households that are now Democratic leaning, while the Dems have ceded the lower rungs.

And you know what? There are a FUCK-ton more of people making less than $100K/year, and those without college degrees. They are the MAGA base, and they are solidly in the Trump/trumpism/neo-populist camp. And the next time red rose Twitter tells you that they have their fingers on the pulse of the people, you can tell them that nope, they are wrong, and their ideas aren’t resonating.

But is it a realignment? Here Nate waffles a bit (understandably):

Whether all of this counts as a “realignment” depends on how one defines the term. A realignment usually means one party obtains a significant political advantage for decades. By this measure, the Trump elections plainly fall short. Republicans barely hold any meaningful advantage; even if they do, it’s not at all clear whether it will even last four years.

Nonetheless, the Trump elections have two features of a realignment: They changed the basic political conflict between the two parties, and they led to corresponding changes in the two coalitions. These changes aren’t minor and they’re not just because of the singular force of Mr. Trump, either. Like previous realignments, it is part of a broader political change occurring across Western democracies, where the remnants of the old industrial political order is being supplanted by something different.

What I think he’s saying is that it is too soon to tell, but I am pretty sure that the dreams of the Never Trumpers that once Trump chokes down his final burger, that rationality will once again descend upon the Republicans, and their exile will end, with the party welcoming them back with open arms to resume the mantle of good governance.²

Alas, this fever will not soon break, and for the foreseeable future, there will be roiling conflict at the national level in politics.

The parties of the center-left, on the other hand, increasingly depend on the support of a new class of affluent college graduates. These parties may still yearn to champion the working class, but this hasn’t been their animating force for decades. Instead, they draw their energy from idealistic, college-educated progressive activists, whose cultural and economic views often alienate working-class voters. Even when these parties do aim to help working-class voters, their policies don’t pack an electoral punch. Instead, their electoral fortunes depend on forming coalitions with classically liberal but traditional conservatives, who oppose the populist right on trade, immigration, foreign policy and democracy.

The good news is that the Democrats are FINALLY beginning to focus on the local, state, and regional electorate, something the Republicans have been aggressively working on since Goldwater’s blow out in 1964. But that will take a long time. And with the coming Trump administration, odds are good that Alito, Thomas and probably Sotomayor will leave the bench, allowing Trump to cement a 7-2 multi-decade conservative slant to the Supreme court.

It’s gon’ get bumpy me thinks.

1. I am certain I will get some hate for this, but the problem of the Democrats isn’t that they aren’t left enough, it is that America is a center-right populus, and the wacky ideas of the far left is a major turn off to huge swaths of people.

If you find yourself liking Brie Brie Joy, David Sirota and others, you are far closer to MAGA that you are likely willing to admit.

2. Writing that made me puke a little bit

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