> ## Content Index
> Fetch the complete content index at: https://www.sweatyspice.com/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover other available public pages before exploring further.

# The Constitution Doesn't Enforce Itself
- URL: https://www.sweatyspice.com/the-constitution-doesnt-enforce-itself/
- Published: 2026-11-16T16:00:00.000Z
- Updated: 2026-11-16T16:00:00.000Z
- Description: The Democrats won Congress. They have the gavels, the subpoenas, and the power of the purse. But who is going to make the Trump administration obey?
- Author: Geoff Anderson
- Tags: Political Musing

Well, that was a hell of an election.

Last Tuesday, the American electorate gave Donald Trump and the Republican Party a pretty unambiguous message. Democrats regained control of both chambers of Congress, flipping more than forty House seats in the process. Hell, Mississippi elected Scott Colom to the Senate, the first Black senator from that state since Reconstruction.

Mississippi!

For a brief moment, it seemed that perhaps Trump had been chastened. That the magnitude of the repudiation might cause some introspection, perhaps even a little moderation. I know, I know. What was I thinking?

Because within days, Trump had replaced Susie Wiles as White House Chief of Staff with Stephen Miller, arguably the most aggressive advocate of executive power in his administration.

Not exactly the personnel move of a man who has taken the electorate's message to heart.

Then House Republicans, confronted with the wreckage of their electoral fortunes, selected Jim Jordan as their incoming minority leader. A man whose principal political skill seems to be yelling at people in congressional hearings. Apparently, the Republican response to losing the House was to find someone who could shout about it more effectively.

And then came the threats.

On November 9, White House counsel Will Scharf [sent a letter to incoming House Oversight chairman Robert Garcia](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/white-house-counsel-will-scharf-house-oversight-committee-robert-garcia-investigations/?ref=sweatyspice.com)suggesting that Democrats' planned investigations might cross into criminal conduct.

Think about that for a moment.

The newly elected congressional majority hasn't even been seated, much less issued subpoenas, and the White House is already floating the possibility of criminal investigations of the people who intend to investigate it.

Subtle.

All of this got me thinking about something we've been told, repeatedly, since Donald Trump first descended that golden escalator in 2015.

> *The guardrails will hold.*

Will they?

### The guardrails

For the better part of a decade, we've been assured that the American constitutional system was designed to withstand precisely the sort of executive overreach Trump represents.

We have three coequal branches of government. Checks and balances. The separation of powers. Congress controls the purse strings. Courts can block illegal actions. The Justice Department enforces the law.

All true.

And yet, as we've watched the first two years of Trump's second administration unfold, I've become increasingly skeptical that these protections are nearly as robust as we've been led to believe.

Not because the Constitution is meaningless, or because the laws don't exist.

It's because a surprising number of the protections we have come to rely upon are norms, conventions, and institutional practices that depend on the people exercising power respecting limits on that power.

And even when those limits are explicitly written into law, somebody has to enforce them.

That last bit is where things begin to get uncomfortable.

### A subpoena is a piece of paper

The Democrats will take control of Congress in January, and with that control comes the authority to conduct oversight.

And boy, is there a lot to investigate.

The Iran war. Immigration enforcement. The Department of Justice's treatment of Trump's political opponents. Government contracts and potential conflicts of interest. The Trump family's business dealings. The handling of the Epstein files.

Just getting through the list could consume an entire congressional term.

But let's say a Democratic committee issues a subpoena to an administration official, demanding documents concerning a particularly questionable decision.

The official refuses.

Congress votes to hold the official in contempt.

Now what?

Well, under federal law, criminal contempt of Congress is referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution.

Yes, *that* Department of Justice.

The one headed by officials appointed by Trump, serving in an administration whose activities Congress is attempting to investigate.

Surely the law requires DOJ to prosecute someone who defies a lawful congressional subpoena?

Not exactly.

The [Congressional Research Service explains](https://www.congress.gov/crs%5Fexternal%5Fproducts/LSB/PDF/LSB10974/LSB10974.1.pdf?ref=sweatyspice.com) that DOJ maintains prosecutorial discretion over congressional contempt referrals, even though the relevant statute uses mandatory language.

Between 2008 and the publication of that CRS analysis, the House referred ten people for criminal contempt. DOJ sought indictments against two.

Two.

And there's an additional absurdity here. Criminal contempt is primarily a punishment for refusing to comply. Even a successful prosecution doesn't necessarily deliver the documents Congress wanted in the first place.

Of course, Congress has another option. It can go to federal court and sue to enforce the subpoena.

And that is a real remedy. A judge can order compliance, and continued defiance can result in civil contempt sanctions, including fines or, in appropriate circumstances, confinement.

But litigation takes time. Lots of time.

There can be arguments over the validity of the subpoena, executive privilege, jurisdiction, the scope of the documents, appeals, and requests for stays.

Meanwhile, the clock keeps ticking.

The incoming Congress has two years before the next election. If an administration can delay production for a year or eighteen months, how useful is a favorable court ruling?

And remember, this doesn't have to involve only administration officials.

Suppose Congress subpoenas a bank, a government contractor, or a business partner with financial ties to the administration. Those private parties don't automatically have the same executive-privilege defenses available to White House officials.

But they can challenge subpoenas, too.

Some will comply. Others may calculate that preserving their relationship with the administration is worth the expense of litigation.

Civil courts can eventually compel compliance, but the process is neither instantaneous nor guaranteed to conclude before the investigation loses its relevance.

A subpoena is a powerful legal instrument.

It is not a magic wand.

Sweaty's Corner doesn't have a marketing budget or an algorithm pushing it into anyone's feed. It has readers who share it. If this one landed, sending it to someone who'd get something out of it — or subscribing so the next one finds you directly — genuinely moves the needle. 

[ Subscribe ](#/portal/signup) Share this post 

### The power of the purse. Sort of.

Ah, but Congress has the ultimate weapon, right?

The power of the purse!

It's right there in Article I of the Constitution. Congress decides how federal money is spent. The president can't simply ignore appropriations laws.

Except there's a rather important operational detail that tends to get lost in civics lessons.

> **Congress doesn't actually spend the money.**

The IRS collects taxes. Customs duties and other revenues flow into Treasury accounts. Congress passes laws authorizing expenditures.

But the actual machinery that makes those expenditures happen resides almost entirely in the executive branch.

The Office of Management and Budget, under Russ Vought, controls a process called *apportionment*. In simplified terms, OMB determines when and in what amounts appropriated funds become available for agencies to obligate.

The agencies then award grants, sign contracts, and administer programs. Treasury processes the resulting payments.

Congress authorizes the spending.

The executive branch operates the machinery.

And if OMB decides to slow-walk the release of funds, or attach restrictions that prevent agencies from committing the money, Congress can find itself in the peculiar position of having legally appropriated money that isn't being spent.

This isn't some hypothetical scenario.

During Trump's first administration, OMB withheld military assistance that Congress had appropriated for Ukraine. In January 2020, the [Government Accountability Office concluded](https://www.gao.gov/products/b-331564?ref=sweatyspice.com) that the withholding violated the Impoundment Control Act.

There was an actual law. There was an actual violation, according to the government's independent watchdog.

And Trump survived the resulting impeachment proceedings.

Fast forward to 2026.

In September, the Trump administration submitted a package of proposed spending rescissions just five days before the fiscal year ended. OMB withheld the affected funds while Congress was supposed to have an opportunity to consider the proposals.

The [GAO concluded](https://www.gao.gov/products/b-338788?ref=sweatyspice.com) that the administration could not lawfully use that process to let the appropriations expire before Congress had acted.

Here's the important part.

GAO can identify violations of appropriations law. Under certain circumstances, it can even sue to compel the release of unlawfully withheld funds.

But it cannot simply reach into OMB's systems and release the money itself.

It has to invoke a legal process, which can involve statutory waiting periods and litigation.

And when appropriations are approaching their expiration date, time becomes a weapon.

This is the sort of thing Vought understands extremely well. His office has also challenged the legal requirement to publicly disclose apportionment decisions, prompting a [formal objection from GAO in April 2025](https://www.gao.gov/products/e12062?ref=sweatyspice.com).

I don't think we're looking at an accidental misunderstanding of federal budgeting procedures.

We're looking at a serious conflict over who ultimately controls the execution of congressional spending decisions.

### James Madison had a theory

One of the foundational arguments for the American system of government came from James Madison in *Federalist No. 51*.

His premise was that government needed checks on its own power because the people operating it couldn't be presumed virtuous.

He wrote:

> Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.

The idea was straightforward. Congress would defend its constitutional authority against presidential encroachment. The judiciary would protect its independence. Each institution would have both the authority and the incentive to resist the others.

Pretty clever, actually.

But there's a potential flaw that becomes increasingly apparent when we look at modern partisan politics.

**What happens when loyalty to a political leader becomes more important than loyalty to the institution in which you serve?**

For the first two years of Trump's second term, congressional Republicans had ample opportunity to assert the legislative branch's authority.

They largely chose not to.

The Constitution didn't change. The institutional incentives Madison envisioned were still there. But partisan loyalty frequently prevailed over institutional independence.

Now the electorate has replaced the Republican majority with Democrats.

And those Democrats will have the constitutional authority to conduct oversight, demand information, and control new appropriations.

What they won't have is direct control over the executive officials responsible for carrying out many of those decisions.

The system Madison designed assumes competing ambitions will produce checks on power.

But modern political parties can align ambitions across supposedly independent branches of government.

And once that happens, the institutional checks become considerably less reliable.

### The political calculation

There's another dimension to this that I find particularly troubling.

I suspect a substantial portion of Trump's political base would enthusiastically support him telling Democratic investigators to pound sand.

Not reluctantly tolerate it.

Cheer it on.

There are also Republicans who may dislike Trump's conduct but continue supporting him because they favor his tax policies, regulatory agenda, judicial appointments, or other priorities.

We shouldn't confuse those groups, and I wouldn't pretend to know exactly how many Americans would applaud defying congressional oversight.

But the political incentive is worth considering.

If Trump's committed supporters reward confrontation, and enough other Republicans tolerate it, then resisting congressional investigations may carry fewer political costs than cooperating with them.

Every subpoena becomes another opportunity to denounce a partisan witch hunt.

Every lawsuit becomes another fundraising appeal.

Every refusal to produce documents becomes evidence, to the faithful, that Trump is fighting the people they want him to fight.

And if a court eventually orders compliance?

Fight some more. Appeal. Contest the scope of the ruling. Seek a stay.

I'm not suggesting every legal challenge is illegitimate, or that every delay constitutes obstruction. Executive officials and private parties have genuine legal rights, including the right to contest unlawful subpoenas.

But those protections can also be used to consume time.

And time is the one thing a congressional investigation cannot manufacture.

The administration doesn't have to win every lawsuit to frustrate congressional oversight.

Sometimes it merely has to keep the argument going.

### So, what happens now?

I don't want to suggest that Congress is powerless, or that the courts are meaningless.

They're not.

Judges can issue binding orders. Civil contempt sanctions can compel cooperation. Congress can withhold new spending authority, investigate private parties, expose misconduct, and bring tremendous political pressure to bear.

Career federal employees have legal obligations independent of their political leadership. States, contractors, and individuals can pursue litigation when unlawful government actions harm them.

These are real protections.

But there's a difference between having a legal remedy and having a remedy that works in time to matter.

That's the distinction I keep coming back to.

The incoming Democratic Congress may uncover serious misconduct. It may win significant court victories. It may establish beyond any reasonable dispute that particular executive actions violated federal law.

And yet, if securing compliance takes months or years, the practical consequences could be remarkably limited.

This is where my thinking about the vaunted guardrails has changed.

We spent years being reassured that the institutions would restrain Trump, that the people surrounding him would prevent his worst impulses, and that the rule of law would ultimately prevail.

Some of those restraints worked. Some failed. Others depended on individual officials who were willing to risk their careers rather than carry out improper instructions.

But a system that depends on finding a few sufficiently principled individuals at precisely the right moment is not nearly as robust as we've been encouraged to believe.

And a system in which the executive branch can frustrate congressional oversight simply by resisting, litigating, and running out the clock has a serious institutional vulnerability.

**Relying on the better nature of men is *not* a strategy for governance.**

Madison understood that more than two centuries ago.

We seem to have forgotten it.

The Democrats will take their seats in January. They'll have the gavels, the committee rooms, the subpoenas, and the constitutional authority to investigate the administration.

The White House, meanwhile, has installed Stephen Miller as Chief of Staff and begun warning that the people conducting those investigations may themselves face criminal scrutiny.

I don't know how much of that is bluster, or how far the administration will actually go in resisting lawful oversight.

But I do know that the institutions cannot function merely because we insist that they should.

The Constitution provides the authority.

Somebody still has to enforce it.

And that is the part of this story that worries me most.

Sweaty's Corner doesn't have a marketing budget or an algorithm pushing it into anyone's feed. It has readers who share it. If this one landed, sending it to someone who'd get something out of it — or subscribing so the next one finds you directly — genuinely moves the needle. 

[ Subscribe ](#/portal/signup) Share this post